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CHEVRON’S GENERALITY PRINCIPLES
Emily Hammond*
Chevron is surely one of the most influential doctrines of administrative
law. Both in judicial opinions and the scholarly literature, its original
insights and subsequent evolution have contributed much to our
understanding of the roles of the “four” branches, especially as those roles
relate to judicial review. But what does Chevron have to say about the
many agency behaviors that are relatively insulated from review? The vast
majority of agency policymaking decisions never reach court; for example,
they might not be “final” or even “action,” or they may pose standing or
ripeness difficulties for would-be petitioners. This Essay argues that
Chevron’s impact might reach even these rarely reviewed types of agency
behavior. Descriptively, this claim is supported by an analysis of judicial
opinions applying Chevron principles to assess agency actions that are not
interpretations of organic statutes. Normatively, this claim challenges
administrative law to turn its focus to agencies’ unreviewable discretionary
space, where a Chevron lens offers important insights about the extent to
which agencies can construct their own legitimacy.
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 656
I. THE SPECTRUM FOR CONSTRUCTING LEGITIMACY ............................. 660
A. Guideposts ............................................................................... 660
1. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns ............................. 660
2. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA ................................ 661
3. United States v. Mead Corp. ............................................. 664
B. Second-Order Chevron Decisions ........................................... 666
C. Developing Generality Principles ........................................... 673
II. DERIVING METRICS FOR AGENCY BEHAVIOR .................................... 673
A. The Scope of Agency Authority ................................................ 674
B. Agency Expertise, Uniformity, and Procedural Detail ............ 675
C. Possible Objections ................................................................. 677
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 678

* Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. My thanks to the
Fordham Law Review for sponsoring this symposium, to Peter Shane and Chris Walker for
organizing it, and to all the symposium participants for their insights.

655

656

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

INTRODUCTION
Thirty years after the ―quiet revolution‖1 that was Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,2 the doctrine bearing that
decision’s name is arguably the most cited of administrative law.3 It stands
at the heart of judicial review of administrative action, captivating scholars’
imaginations and providing the seductive ease of a two-step formula for
litigants and lower courts. But what does the doctrine have to say about the
many agency behaviors that are relatively insulated from judicial review? I
take up that question in this Essay.4
The governing paradigm is that judicial review is a necessary component
of administrative legitimacy.5 It acts as an ex ante check on agency
behavior by incentivizing agencies to promote participation, engage in
deliberation, and set forth their reasoning transparently in the first instance.6
It promotes dialogue between the branches7 and amongst agencies and their
stakeholders.8 And it acts as a backstop, guarding against arbitrariness9
and—in denying petitions for review—putting the imprimatur of approval
on various agency actions.10
These functions, of course, are not specific to Chevron. The Chevron
context adds nuances. For example, Step One promotes judicial and
administrative uniformity because it mandates adherence to a determination
1. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 532 (6th ed. 2013).
2. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron provided a two-step means of reviewing agencies’
interpretations of their statutory mandates. First, a court asks whether Congress addressed
the precise question at issue; second, if the text is ambiguous, the court upholds the agency’s
construction if it is reasonable. Id. at 842–43.
3. EMILY HAMMOND ET AL., The Chevron Doctrine, in JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript on file with author).
4. This Essay is part of a larger symposium entitled Chevron at 30: Looking Back and
Looking Forward. For an overview of the symposium, see Peter M. Shane & Christopher J.
Walker, Foreword: Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 475 (2014). Two contributors to this symposium explore other aspects of the role of
Chevron inside the regulatory state. See Peter M. Shane, Chevron Deference, the Rule of
Law, and Presidential Influence in the Administrative State, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 679
(2014) (exploring the President’s role in the Chevron deference regime); Christopher J.
Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 703 (2014) (exploring empirically Chevron’s effect on agency statutory interpretative
practices).
5. See Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial
Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 315
(2013) (providing background and collecting sources). By ―legitimacy,‖ I mean both fidelity
to statute and conformity with administrative law values such as participation, deliberation,
and transparency. See id. at 316–17 n.18 (collecting sources).
6. See id. at 327; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction:
An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1691 (2004).
7. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures As Politics in Administrative Law, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1805 (2007).
8. Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial
Review As Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 778–89 (2011)
[hereinafter Hammond].
9. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003).
10. Hammond & Markell, supra note 5, at 322.
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that statutory text is clear.11 And at Step Two, the agency’s explanation of
its choice between permissible constructions is a special application of the
reason-giving requirement underlying arbitrary and capricious review; thus,
the administrative law norms set forth above are also furthered in the
Chevron context.12
But there is more. Chevron stands for the proposition that judicial review
is only part of the equation in the quest for administrative legitimacy. At
the surface, this is true because courts are instructed not to engage in de
novo analyses of ambiguous statutes, departing from the traditional role of
saying ―what the law is.‖13 When courts review agencies less robustly, a
fortiori they are making themselves less necessary to ensuring agency
legitimacy than may previously have been thought. Indeed, the language of
Chevron itself suggests that administrative expertise and superior political
accountability—attributes arising within the executive branch—promote
legitimacy and justify a correspondingly diminished role for the courts.14
More deeply, Chevron approves of agencies’ flexibility to change their
minds—even on questions of law.15 In Chevron itself, Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) had revised its interpretation of ―stationary
source‖ following a change in administration.16 The decision therefore
stands for the proposition that there is nothing inherently illegitimate in an
agency’s revising its interpretation.17
The changes ushered in by Chevron therefore shift the legitimation
emphasis away from courts and toward agencies. Suppose, however, that
one looks even further beyond judicial review to the behavior of agencies
themselves. Underlying the notion that courts ought to be deferential to
agencies is a broader principle of agency flexibility within the zones of
statutory discretion. Indeed, even if we remove judicial review from the
landscape altogether, Chevron offers insights for agencies’ ability to
construct their own legitimacy.
In this Essay, I explore that hypothesis. First, it is helpful to clarify what
I mean by an agency constructing its own legitimacy. I define legitimacy
11. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 968–
69 (2005) (holding that Step One decisions have preclusive effect); Peter L. Strauss, One
Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited
Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1118–29 (1987)
(arguing that Chevron’s structure promotes Supreme Court correction of lower court
mistakes more readily than would a multifactor inquiry).
12. See HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 3, at 28–29 (describing competing understandings
and urging this particular Step Two approach).
13. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
14. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984).
15. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (noting that under Chevron, ―the agency is free to give the statute
whichever of several possible meanings it thinks most conducive to accomplishment of the
statutory purpose‖).
16. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 851.
17. See id. at 853–58; Scalia, supra note 15, at 518; see also FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514–16 (2009) (holding that the arbitrary and capricious
standard does not require heightened explanation when an agency departs from prior policy).
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broadly, encompassing both statutory and democratic legitimacy. An
important premise of this Essay is that administrative law values—
participation, deliberation, transparency, and reason-giving—further both
kinds of legitimacy.18 In the absence of judicial review, however, it is
exceedingly difficult to measure an agency’s performance. Although one
may be able to identify participation-enhancing procedures or reasongiving, there is no real baseline against which to assess the norm of
―legitimacy.‖19 Nor can one objectively determine that an agency’s
ultimate action best furthers a statute’s policies because ―best‖ is in the eye
of the beholder.20
There are at least a few guiding principles, operating across a spectrum.
At one end of the spectrum is the principle from Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass’ns21 that an agency cannot cure an unconstitutional delegation
of power by adopting a limiting construction of its statutory mandate.22
That is, an agency’s ―voluntary self-denial‖ of power cannot undo an
unconstitutional delegation of that power by the legislature.23 In such
circumstances, courts are at the zenith of their power and agencies are
wholly unable to impact their own legitimacy.
At the other end of the spectrum is the doctrine enunciated in United
States v. Mead Corp.24 One product of that decision is the difficult-toapply principle that agencies can influence the level of deference they
receive by choosing procedures that tend to ―foster fairness and
deliberation.‖25 This link between agency choice of procedure and
substantive legitimacy has important ramifications for judicial review.26
But does it hold lessons for agencies’ behavior more generally?
The question has real-world implications. Agencies constantly face new
circumstances in which their statutory mandates provide little guidance or
even clear authority.27 Topics such as sustainability, climate change, and
energy policy lack comprehensive statutory schemes; agencies must rely on
their inherent discretionary authority to tackle these issues. Consider, for
example, an EPA guidance document issued in conjunction with a
18. See Hammond & Markell, supra note 5, at 320–27 (drawing on administrative law
and procedural justice literatures to consider how judicial review furthers administrative
legitimacy).
19. My coauthor and I recently attempted to do this and found the issue of testability
very challenging. See id. at 327–30 (developing metrics for legitimacy); id. at 362–63
(discussing limitations of those metrics).
20. See id. at 353 (providing example).
21. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
22. Id. at 472–73.
23. Id. at 473.
24. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
25. Id. at 230; see also Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 273, 279–80 (2011) (describing the puzzles of this part of the Mead decision).
26. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (setting forth Skidmore-like
factors for use in Step Zero analyses); Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV.
187, 213–19 (2006) (providing examples of how lower courts have connected choice of
procedure to standard of review following Mead and Barnhart).
27. See Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2393033.
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rulemaking that imposed stricter Clean Air Act (CAA) controls on
emissions of air toxics from electricity generation. Section 112 of the CAA
requires existing sources to meet the rule’s standards within three years of
the effective date of the rule.28 The CAA also provides limited
circumstances in which EPA may extend the time to comply with such
standards.29
In the face of strong opposition from the coal-fired electricity industry,
which argued that the new standards would diminish electricity reliability,
President Obama directed EPA to issue a guidance memo that explained
how it would address compliance with the standards in the coming years.30
In this memo, EPA indicated its intent to use its enforcement discretion to
liberally grant time extensions to electricity generators that made certain
showings related to reliability.31 But the CAA does not specifically address
the reliability issue: EPA exercised its discretion, using an unreviewable
approach,32 to accommodate competing public interests in clean air and
electricity reliability.
Can agencies construct their own intrinsic legitimacy in the absence of
judicial review?33 And if so, are there any limits on agencies’ abilities to
take such actions? This Essay posits that Chevron—while not directly
imposing those limits—indeed influences our sense of what those limits are.
Moreover, it informs the quest to look beyond judicial review for sources of
agency legitimacy. In essence, Chevron stands for a variety of ―generality‖
principles that extend broadly throughout administrative law. And in
particular, my ultimate focus here is on ―intrinsic‖ agency legitimacy,
which is meant to capture the ideals of agency legitimacy in the absence of
external oversight. Chevron’s generality principles, I argue, suggest
metrics for assessing that legitimacy.
Part I of this Essay begins by elaborating the spectrum described in this
Introduction. As already alluded to, Chevron interacts strongly with each
doctrine on the spectrum. Next, Part I delves into what I call ―secondorder‖ Chevron decisions—that is, those opinions applying Chevron to
agency interpretations of text not appearing in their statutory mandates.
28. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-159, § 112(i)(3)(A), 69 Stat.
322 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7626).
29. Id. § 112(i)(3)(B), (4)–(6).
30. Memorandum from Cynthia Giles, Assistant Adm’r of the Office of Enforcement
and Compliance Assurance, to Regional Administrators (EPA Regions I–X) et al. (Dec. 16,
2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/mats/pdfs/EnforcementResponsePolicyforCAA113
.pdf.
31. See id. at 4.
32. The approach is doubly unreviewable. As a guidance document, it is difficult to
challenge given various reviewability doctrines like finality and ripeness. See 5 U.S.C. § 704
(2012) (finality); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967) (ripeness). And as an
exercise of enforcement discretion, it is presumptively unreviewable in any event. See
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
33. I refer to ―intrinsic‖ legitimacy synonymously with ―inside-out‖ legitimacy, as
coined by Professors Shapiro and Wright and as I have adopted the terms in my own work.
Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency:
Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 578 (2011); cf. Hammond
& Markell, supra note 5, at 316 n.12.
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This discussion reveals a comprehensive commitment to the underlying
background principles upon which Chevron was initially based. Part I
concludes by showing how those background principles inform our sense of
legitimacy for agency actions generally, even in the absence of judicial
review. Although this Essay acknowledges the difficulty of measuring
agency legitimacy for activities not subject to judicial review, it suggests in
Part II that Chevron’s background principles inform even this more elusive
context. Part II suggests potential metrics for gauging intrinsic agency
legitimacy, while acknowledging the difficulties attendant in
operationalizing at least some of the metrics. After considering this and
other potential objections to my approach, this Essay returns to the concept
of Chevron as a generality principle, reinforcing how that doctrine informs
the legitimacy of elusive agency behaviors.
I. THE SPECTRUM FOR CONSTRUCTING LEGITIMACY
As noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court has offered some guidance on
agencies’ ability to construct their own legitimacy. To illustrate, this
section considers three such decisions with deeply relevant connections to
Chevron: Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Utility Air Regulatory
Group v. EPA,34 and United States v. Mead Corp.35
A. Guideposts
1. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns
Prior to any consideration of agency legitimacy is the constitutional
legitimacy of the delegation in an agency’s statutory mandate. Although
the Court has not invalidated any statute on nondelegation grounds since the
1930s,36 the nondelegation doctrine influences administrative law in
important ways.
In American Trucking, various petitioners representing industry interests
challenged EPA’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for
certain air pollutants.37 The NAAQS were promulgated pursuant to the
CAA, which instructed in relevant part that EPA was to set such standards
based on criteria ―requisite to protect the public health‖ with ―an adequate
margin of safety.‖38 EPA’s task wasn’t easy: for nonthreshold pollutants,
those for which there is no known exposure threshold below which there

34. 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
35. To this list might be added City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013), which
held that Chevron applies to agencies’ interpretations of the scope of their statutory
jurisdiction.
36. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref.
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
37. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 462–63 (2001).
38. Id. at 465; 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012).
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are no adverse impacts, crafting a numerical exposure standard meant
making a policy judgment in light of scientific uncertainty.39
Although EPA developed a set of factors to explain its decision to set the
standards at particular points, the D.C. Circuit concluded that those factors
were too indeterminate; moreover, the statute itself did not provide EPA
any guidance in deciding where to draw the line.40 Thus, the court
remanded the case to EPA to adopt an approach that would supply the
missing determinacy.41 The court’s rationale was two-fold. First, if an
agency creates binding standards for itself, it is less likely to act
arbitrarily.42 And second, if the agency created such standards, those would
facilitate judicial review.43 Although the court had acknowledged that this
approach meant the agency, rather than Congress, would be making
important policy decisions, it reasoned that EPA could use its expertise to
―salvage‖ the statute.44
In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court rejected the
possibility that an agency can cure an unconstitutional delegation of power:
―an agency’s voluntary self-denial‖ would itself be an exercise of
―forbidden‖ power.45 The Court offered little more guidance and did not
engage the D.C. Circuit’s rationale,46 but the bottom line was clear: when
confronted directly with nondelegation concerns, agencies may not
construct their own legitimacy.
How does this principle relate to Chevron? As Professor Pierce has
explained, Chevron helps enforce the nondelegation doctrine because it
changes the incentives for Congress.47 That is, rather than attempt the
impossible task of delineating rules for Congress to follow in creating
permissible delegations, the Court has signaled to Congress that it will
consider ambiguous statutory terms as evidence that Congress intends the
Executive to have primary policymaking authority.48 If Congress wishes to
avoid this result, it can enact statutes that are more detailed and hence, less
open to agency interpretation.49
2. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA
Chevron’s relationship to the nondelegation doctrine helps explain
another CAA decision, Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG) v. EPA. As a
39. For further discussion, see Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034–37
(D.C. Cir. 1999), rev’d, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
40. Id. at 1034.
41. Id. at 1038.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001).
46. Instead, the Court proceeded to explain why the statute was sufficiently intelligible
to fit within existing nondelegation jurisprudence. Id. at 473–76.
47. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225,
2230–32 (1997).
48. See id. at 2231.
49. See id. at 2232.
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result of earlier developments,50 EPA promulgated regulations setting
standards for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from new motor vehicles.51
The Agency determined that regulating such emissions triggered an
obligation to regulate GHG emissions from stationary sources under,
among other things, the prevention of significant deterioration (PSD)
provisions of the CAA.52 This result followed because ―air pollutant‖ was
used in operative provisions of each title—and ―air pollutant‖ included
GHGs.53
When EPA issued the relevant rule, however, it explained a fundamental
problem it faced: the PSD provisions of the statute explicitly apply to
sources emitting 100 or 250 tons per year of ―air pollutants.‖54 But GHGs
are emitted at much higher levels, and applying the statute literally would
have significantly enlarged the number of sources subject to the program,
placed enormous burdens on the permitting authorities, and, essentially,
gone far beyond Congress’s intent that only major sources should be subject
to PSD requirements.55 Nevertheless, EPA explained that the statute’s use
of ―air pollutant‖ compelled its interpretation, so it issued the ―Tailoring
Rule,‖ which set the applicable emissions limits at 75,000 or 100,000 tons
per year, as a way of departing from the statutory text ―no more than
necessary to render the requirements administrable.‖56
When the Supreme Court confronted the Tailoring Rule, it applied the
Chevron doctrine to EPA’s interpretation of its statutory mandate.57 But
the Court rejected EPA’s interpretation without even engaging the agency’s
explanation. First, the Court reasoned that the statute did not compel EPA’s
interpretation: ―air pollutant‖ as used in the operative provisions of the
statute did not necessarily carry the same meaning as the term when used
broadly in the statute’s general definitions.58 Second, the Court explained
that EPA’s interpretation was unreasonable
because it would bring about an enormous and transformative expansion
in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.
When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded
power to regulate ―a significant portion of the American economy,‖ we
typically greet its announcement with a measure of skepticism. We

50. E.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding CAA’s term ―air
pollutant‖ encompasses greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and holding EPA’s rationale for
failure to regulate GHG emissions from new motor vehicles arbitrary and capricious).
51. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. (UARG) v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2437 (2014).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 2442–43 (describing the statute and EPA’s rule).
55. Id.
56. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule,
75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,517 (proposed June 3, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70,
71).
57. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2439.
58. Id. at 2439–42.
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expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency
decisions of vast ―economic and political significance.‖ 59

In other words, the precise language of the statute, if followed, would have
so expanded EPA’s jurisdiction that Congress simply could not have
intended that result. It is perhaps curious that the Court announced this
interpretation at Step Two, rather than Step One; after all, Step One is
primarily directed at determining whether Congress intended to delegate
interpretive authority to the agency with regard to the precise question at
issue.60
But could EPA’s Tailoring Rule save its interpretation? No, said the
Court. Even though EPA had adopted a construction of the statute that
limited its jurisdiction,61 it had departed from the clear statutory text.62
Although the CAA granted EPA broad power, the agency did not have the
power to ―revise clear statutory terms that turn out not to work in
practice.‖63
UARG’s result is unusual from a Chevron standpoint. The Court held
that there was ambiguity in the term ―air pollutant,‖ but that EPA’s
interpretation was unreasonable because it would extend EPA’s jurisdiction
far beyond that intended by Congress. And EPA’s attempt to limit its
jurisdiction with the Tailoring Rule was impermissible because it
contradicted the express language of the CAA. The result appears to be that
EPA is foreclosed from regulating GHGs under the applicable stationary
source provisions because there is no way to do so that would avoid the
numerical limits Congress provided.64
Typically, EPA could try again on remand to adopt a permissible
construction of the ambiguous term ―air pollutant.‖65 Here, however, the
result is such that the Court’s pronouncement is binding, having the same
impact as if the Court held that the meaning of ―air pollutant‖ is clear in
foreclosing GHGs for the operative provisions of the statute. In other
words, EPA is unable to adopt a limiting construction of the CAA to
assuage concerns that its jurisdiction under the statute would otherwise
extend too far. While not a nondelegation case, the Court’s emphasis on the
need for Congress to speak clearly if it wishes an agency to regulate ―a
significant portion of the American economy‖ does not seem too far

59. Id. at 2444 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120, 159–
60 (2000)).
60. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984).
61. See UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2454 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting that EPA’s interpretation exempts sources from regulation).
62. Id. at 2445.
63. Id. at 2446.
64. EPA retains authority to regulate GHGs under other provisions of the CAA,
however. Id. at 2448–49 (upholding EPA’s permissible construction of statute for other types
of sources of GHGs).
65. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980–
91 (2005) (applying Chevron framework to FCC decision).
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removed from the logic of American Trucking.66 Further, the case
illustrates how Chevron might work as a nondelegation incentivizer.
Congress set precise, numerical limits on EPA’s authority, which easily
obviated any concern that intelligible principles were lacking. The agency,
in turn, was limited in the sense that, with respect to that precise issue, it
had no flexibility to adopt a different interpretation. This case thus
illustrates the nondelegation basis for Chevron while also providing a stark
example of the potential power of statutory text. When such text is
extremely precise, agencies may not depart from the statutory terms,
regardless of broader statutory purposes or the administrative law values
evident in the agencies’ means of adopting their particular constructions.
3. United States v. Mead Corp.
The first two cases above illustrate how an agency may be completely
barred from creating its legitimacy. The Mead decision, a direct descendant
of Chevron, offers an important point of contrast. That case, of course,
involved the U.S. Customs Service’s decision classifying Mead planners as
diaries for tariff purposes.67 The Court concluded that the decision was not
Chevron-eligible because it did not have the force of law, but that the lesser
Skidmore deference standard applied.68
The Court explained that
congressional intent to delegate interpretive authority was the linchpin of
Chevron, but it (perplexingly) stated that a good indication of such
delegation would be when Congress provides for agency procedures that
―tend[] to foster [] fairness and deliberation.‖69 Although this phrase
focuses on what procedures Congress has required, the opinion itself
focuses on the procedures the agency actually used, notwithstanding that it
is hard to see how an agency’s choice of procedures has anything to do with
congressional intent.70
Despite this awkward logic, Mead is important as a practical matter
because it means an agency’s procedural choices matter. Professor
Bressman has explained one way this works: Mead furthers the courts’ role
in mediating the relationship between Congress and agencies because it
calls for enhanced judicial oversight in situations where agency actions are

66. See UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444; Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475
(2001) (explaining that Congress must provide more guidance for standards ―that affect the
entire national economy‖).
67. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001).
68. Id. (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)).
69. Id. at 230.
70. See id. at 233–34 (discussing why tariff classification was not Chevron-eligible); see
also Seidenfeld, supra note 25, at 279–80 (making this point). This is not to say that there is
always a tension between an agency’s choice of procedures and congressional intent. For
example, the two are aligned when agencies choose to exercise their rulemaking authority as
authorized by Congress, according to notice-and-comment procedures. See City of Arlington
v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013) (finding that Chevron was applicable to agency’s
construction of its own jurisdiction where Congress vested the agency with authority to
administer a statute by rulemaking and adjudication, and when the agency exercised that
authority).
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insulated from legislative oversight.71 In other words, if agencies fail to use
procedures like notice-and-comment rulemaking that facilitate legislative
oversight because of their transparency and reason-giving, courts will step
in with the closer look afforded by the Skidmore standard.
Such actions are often shielded from stakeholder oversight as well. For
example, scholars have criticized nonlegislative rules for being
nonparticipatory, excluding stakeholders from notice-and-comment
procedures and making it more difficult to monitor agency behavior.72
Courts considering whether to apply Chevron to agency actions that are
not in the Chevron-presumptive categories of formal proceedings or noticeand-comment rulemaking have taken notice of the importance of
procedures. Where courts have extended Chevron deference to such
actions, the actions typically were within the agency’s expertise, exhibited
transparency through publication in the Federal Register, evidenced some
type of participation through stakeholder input or a comment period, and
revealed reasoned decisionmaking through written explanations.73 In other
words, although agencies have significant discretion in their choice of
procedure,74 and although courts may not impose procedures on agencies
beyond those required by Congress or the Constitution,75 agencies are
rewarded with Chevron eligibility when they use procedures that enhance
administrative law values.
Of course, these observations stem from examples involving judicial
review. By linking legitimizing procedures to Chevron eligibility, however,
the Court has offered important clues about the room within which agencies
may construct their intrinsic legitimacy. With that in mind, this Essay turns
next to the second-order Chevron decisions.

71. See Bressman, supra note 7, at 1791–92.
72. See, e.g., id. at 1793 (―Unless the position is authoritative, constituents do not know
what to monitor.‖); Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency
Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 440–41 (2007) (suggesting reforms for enhanced
accountability with respect to guidance documents that ultimately rely on judicial review as
a check); Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance
Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331, 342–44 (2011) (describing the potential for agency abuse
of guidance documents).
73. See, e.g., Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1257, 1273
(11th Cir. 2009) (applying Chevron to agency handbook that underwent the same procedures
as official regulations); Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 383 F.3d 49, 60–61 (2d
Cir. 2004) (applying Chevron to HUD policy statement that had been published in the
Federal Register and met various other factors); Schuetz v. Banc One Mortg. Corp., 292 F.3d
1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002) (similar). Many scholars offer further discussion on this point.
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1488 (2005) (suggesting that courts look for ―minimum indicia of
lawmaking authority‖ meant to show ―considered judgment and consistent application‖);
Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 490 (2013)
(describing lower courts’ responses); cf. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002)
(setting forth, in dicta, factors bearing on whether nonpresumptive Chevron actions are
eligible for Chevron deference).
74. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
75. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 543 (1978).
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B. Second-Order Chevron Decisions
This section considers judicial extensions of Chevron to agency actions
in which agencies are not interpreting their statutory mandates. These
second-order Chevron decisions provide a helpful contrast to run-of-themill Chevron cases because they invite scrutiny of the principles animating
Chevron. Studying the reasoning of courts determining whether to extend
Chevron in this way illuminates the doctrine’s background principles for
how agencies legitimate their behavior. Others have considered how courts
ought approach the ―Step Zero‖ question whether to apply Chevron to
agencies’ interpretations of their statutory mandates.76 The difference for
the analysis here is two-fold. First, those considerations are typically aimed
at agencies’ interpretations of their statutory mandates; here I am focused
on second-order extensions. Second, those considerations are typically
aimed at understanding the courts’ role vis-à-vis the executive and
legislative branches and the external oversight provided by the different
branches; here I am focused on intrinsic legitimacy in the absence of
external oversight.
To provide focus, consider whether agencies should receive Chevron
deference for interpretations of contracts concerning their areas of expertise.
First, it bears repeating that the concept of deference to agencies did not
begin with Chevron—and that case itself stated as much.77 This
proposition is also supported by the 1960 Supreme Court decision Texas
Gas Transmission Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.78 There, the Court declined to
defer to the Federal Power Commission’s interpretation of a contract for the
purchase of natural gas because the agency had relied on ordinary rules of
contract interpretation rather than its special expertise.79
Rather than characterizing the matter as one purely of law, the Court
looked specifically to how the agency had arrived at its interpretation.80
Instead of revealing the agency’s interpretation to have been ―on the basis
of specialized knowledge gained from experience in the regulation of the
natural gas business, or upon the basis of any trade practice,‖ the record
disclosed that the agency applied ordinary principles of contract
interpretation.81 This approach exemplifies an early indication of agencies’
ability to construct their own legitimacy, insofar as their choice of rationale
and application of expertise may be relevant to the deference they
ultimately receive.82 Moreover, it foreshadows both Chevron’s reliance on
76. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 73; Sunstein, supra note 26.
77. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) (citing Labor Bd. v. Hearst Pubs., 322 U.S. 111 (1944)).
78. 363 U.S. 263 (1960).
79. Id. at 268–69.
80. The Court cited the Chenery I principle that courts are to review agency decisions on
the basis of the record at the time the decisions were made. Id. at 270 (citing SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943)).
81. Id. at 268.
82. A number of lower courts have explained Texas Gas as one favoring de novo review
for questions of law, thereby limiting that decision’s rationale more than warranted. See, e.g.,
Muratore v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 222 F.3d 918, 921–22 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Texas
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expertise as one of the reasons for deference and Mead’s indication that
agency procedures matter.
Indeed, after Chevron, many courts, especially the D.C. Circuit,
considered extending the doctrine to second-order contexts. Those that
have done so have placed importance on the following factors:
(1) delegation of some authority over the text; (2) actual or presumed
agency expertise; (3) consideration of the agency procedures that were
used; (4) the agency’s need to promote national uniformity; and (5) the
agency’s consistency in its interpretation over time.83
In the 1987 decision National Fuel Gas Supply v. FERC,84 for example,
the D.C. Circuit rejected the argument that it should review a FERCapproved settlement agreement concerning natural gas rates de novo
because the meaning of the agreement was a question of law.85 The court
reasoned that, although a settlement agreement was not written by Congress
but by private parties, Congress nevertheless intended that FERC should be
given deference because of the agency’s broad powers of adjudication.86
Indeed, Congress had required the agency to ―take an active role in
approving the agreement.‖87
With this statement, the court suggested that Chevron’s fictional intent
requirement was satisfied. But the court explained that there were other
reasons for affording deference. When FERC interprets settlement
agreements, those interpretations are enhanced by the agency’s technical
knowledge: ―Construction of a settlement agreement will be influenced by
the agency’s expertise in the technical language of that field and by its
greater knowledge of industry conditions and practices, including its more
comprehensive experience with the kinds of disputes and negotiations that
generally produce such an agreement.‖88 This explanation echoes the
expertise rationale of Chevron and is not inconsistent with Texas Gas.
Uniformity principles also informed the court’s analysis. In deciding
whether the agreement met the statute’s just and reasonable standard, the
court reasoned that FERC may have understood the terms to hold particular
meaning; a contrary judicial interpretation could undermine that
conclusion.89

Gas as having been modified by Chevron); Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply v. FERC, 811 F.2d 1563,
1570 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (same); see also Williams Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 3 F.3d 1544,
1549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (―[T]he Texas Gas rule does not survive the Supreme Court’s
Chevron decision.‖); cf. Bos. Edison Co. v. FERC, 856 F.2d 361, 363 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating
both that agencies are entitled to some deference regarding interpretations rooted in expertise
and that ―agency decision[s] based on pure questions of law may be reviewed de novo‖
(citing Texas Gas, 363 U.S. at 268–70).
83. As noted infra note 122, these factors look very similar to those of Skidmore as well
as Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
84. 811 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
85. Id. at 1563.
86. Id. at 1569–70 & 1570 n.3.
87. Id. at 1571.
88. Id. at 1570.
89. Id. at 1571.
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Although National Fuel Gas Supply involved a settlement of an
adjudication before FERC, the D.C. Circuit quickly extended its Chevron
approach to FERC’s interpretations of contracts that the agency approved.90
And indeed, the D.C. Circuit later held FERC’s contract interpretations are
Chevron-eligible even where the contract did not need agency approval to
take effect.91
A more recent decision, Entergy Services, Inc. v. FERC,92 highlights the
applicable standard of review and provides further insights into Chevron’s
generality principles.93 The case is instructive because it reveals the
distance between second-order interpretations and agencies’ interpretations
of their statutory mandates. Entergy involved a 1977 contract for delivery
of electricity on the wholesale market.94 The parties jointly owned several
power generating facilities, but only the seller, an electric services
company, had control over scheduling and dispatch.95 The parties’ contract
included two different pricing schemes, which varied according to whether
the jointly-owned generation could supply all or some of the buyer’s
demand.96 For example, when the generation could not meet demand, the
buyer would pay a higher amount to the seller because according to the
contract, the buyer did not have ―sufficient resources available.‖97
Increasingly, however, the generation was physically capable of meeting
demand, but transmission system constraints made it impossible for the
seller to actually use that generation.98 The seller attempted to charge the
buyer the higher price, arguing that the terms ―sufficient‖ and ―available‖
meant not just physical generation but also the seller’s ability to use that
generation.99 The buyer filed a complaint with FERC, arguing that the
higher price did not apply because its generation was both sufficient and
available.100
FERC agreed with the buyer. In its order on the dispute, FERC reasoned
that the contract language was ambiguous because it was capable of holding
at least two meanings.101
The agency used canons of contract
interpretation,102 analysis of other contract terms,103 and extrinsic evidence
of the parties’ conduct to determine that the higher price did not apply.104
90. See Vt. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. v. FERC, 817 F.2d 127, 134–35 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(involving FERC-approved contract between a utility and state utilities commission for
electric power delivery).
91. Williams Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 3 F.3d 1544, 1549–51 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
92. 568 F.3d 978 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
93. Id. at 981.
94. Id. at 979.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 980.
97. Id. at 979.
98. Id. at 980.
99. Id. at 983.
100. Id. at 981.
101. Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Entergy Ark., Inc., No. EL05-15-001, 2006 WL 3030149,
at *13–14 (FERC Oct. 25, 2006) (Order on Initial Decision).
102. Id. at *11 n.47.
103. Id. at *10–13.
104. Id. at *18–19.
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On petition for review, the D.C. Circuit explained:
We review claims that the Commission acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in interpreting contracts within its jurisdiction by employing
the familiar principles of Chevron . . . . We evaluate de novo the
Commission’s determination that a contract is ambiguous, but we give
Chevron-like deference to its reasonable interpretation of ambiguous
contract language.105

The court agreed that the contract was ambiguous, and it adopted the
reasoning set forth in FERC’s initial order.106 In determining that FERC’s
interpretation was reasonable, the court followed FERC’s approach of
considering canons of interpretation, other terms in the contract, and the
parties’ course of dealing.107 Finally, in response to the petitioner’s
argument that FERC should have awarded extra compensation as a matter
of fairness, the court stated:
[T]he question before us is not whether the contract was reasonable, a
technical issue as to which courts have little expertise, but rather whether
FERC’s construction of that contract was reasonable—the kind of legal
dispute that this court resolves every day. And as to the latter, we have no
doubt.108

FERC’s detailed initial order and order on petition for rehearing reveal
analyses far more deeply grounded in an understanding of the industry than
the D.C. Circuit’s opinion.109 The agency’s superior expertise is evident, as
is its reasoned decisionmaking and transparent explanation of its decision.
Relatedly, the contract interpretation took place in the context of a formal
adjudication authorized by Congress, which provided the procedural
safeguards found in §§ 556 and 557 of the Administrative Procedure Act.110
Although the context is not an interpretation of a statutory mandate,
therefore, Chevron principles can be used to justify the court’s approach on
review.111
It is tempting to wonder if the FERC example is agency-specific
precedent, with little persuasive force outside of cases involving that
agency.112 Or perhaps it is specific to the D.C. Circuit. The approach,
105. Entergy Servs., Inc. v. FERC, 568 F.3d 978, 981–82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted). The court further explained that the background of negotiations and the parties’
course of dealing were relevant considerations for interpreting ambiguous contracts. Id. at
982.
106. See id. at 983.
107. Id. at 983–85.
108. Id. at 985.
109. See generally Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Entergy Ark., Inc., No. EL05-15-001, 2007
WL 1814451 (FERC June 25, 2007) (Order on Rehearing); Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp., 2006
WL 3030149.
110. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–557 (1990).
111. See also Braintree Elec. Light Dep’t v. FERC, 667 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(applying Chevron deference to FERC interpretation of settlement agreement involving
electric reliability).
112. See generally Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents,
89 TEX. L. REV. 499 (2011). Others have discussed the FERC context. See, e.g., Timothy K.
Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
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however, shows up in other contexts and in other courts. The District Court
for the District of Columbia, for example, cited National Fuel Gas Supply
in extending deference to the Interior Board of Land Appeals’ construction
of a land patent’s ambiguous language involving the status of a right-ofway in Bolack Minerals Co. v. Norton.113 The court emphasized the
importance of delegation,114 expertise,115 and uniformity116 in so doing.
Similar themes are echoed in decisions of other courts.117
On the matter of expertise, the Tenth Circuit has explained that ―under
the principles of Chevron . . . an agency’s interpretation of a contract is
reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard when the subject
matter of the contract involves the agency’s specialized expertise.‖118 Yet
the court determined that such deference was not warranted when the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) interpreted a sentencing
agreement because the agreement was not within HHS’s expertise.119 The
court reasoned that the agreement did not deal with ―arcane subject matter‖
or contain technical terms; HHS did not routinely interpret such
agreements; and reviewing such agreements had not been delegated to HHS
by Congress.120 As a result, the court interpreted the agreement de novo.121
The final factor—delegation by Congress—makes this case
distinguishable from National Fuel Gas Supply because in the latter
instance, FERC had authority to adjudicate the relevant contracts. But also
of interest, the first two considerations on which the Tenth Circuit relied—
agency expertise and experience—represent a functional approach to
determining whether deference ought to be afforded.122
203, 213 n.27 (2004) (―[FERC] appears consistently to receive judicial deference to its
interpretations of the terms of contracts between parties who are subject to its regulatory
jurisdiction.‖); Jerome Nelson, The Chevron Deference Rule and Judicial Review of FERC
Orders, 9 ENERGY L.J. 59, 65–82 (1988) (providing a summary of Chevron’s FERC context).
113. 370 F. Supp. 2d 161, 175 (D.D.C. 2005).
114. Id. at 175–76.
115. Id. at 176.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Muratore v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 222 F.3d 918, 923 (11th Cir.
2000) (extending Chevron to an Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) interpretation of
a federal employee’s health insurance contract; factors included delegation, expertise, and
uniformity).
118. Sternberg v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 299 F.3d 1201, 1205 (10th Cir. 2002)
(internal citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit’s approach is traceable to National Gas Fuel
Supply. See Nw. Pipeline Corp. v. FERC, 61 F.3d 1479, 1486–87 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying
National Fuel Gas Supply rationale to FERC’s interpretation of natural gas pipeline tariff).
119. Sternberg, 299 F.3d at 1205.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1205–06.
122. This approach is not altogether different from that suggested in Justice Breyer’s
Barnhart dictum. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (citing ―the interstitial
nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the
question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the
careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of time‖ as
reasons for Chevron deference). Indeed, even courts that reject a categorical second-order
Chevron approach have recognized the functional approach of Texas Gas. See Amoco Prod.
Co. v. FERC, 765 F.2d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Bos. Edison, Co. v. FERC, 233
F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 2000) (―FERC is entitled to some deference in construing contracts

2014]

CHEVRON’S GENERALITY PRINCIPLES

671

Relatedly, the D.C. Circuit has applied a functional approach in stating
that agency interpretations may not warrant Chevron deference when the
agency has vacillated in its position over time.123 In Idaho Power v.
FERC,124 the court rejected FERC’s interpretation of a right-of-first-refusal
provision in a filed contract to provide electric transmission service both
because the agency’s interpretation had changed over time and because it
was ―nonsensical.‖125 At issue was FERC’s pro forma, required right-offirst-refusal term for Open-Access Transmission Tariffs (OATTs)
developed pursuant to FERC Order 888.126 Under this term, the
transmission company was required to give a right of first refusal to
incumbent customers provided that they accepted contract terms ―at least
equal to‖ those offered by new, competing customers.127 FERC interpreted
that language to mean that the competing customers’ terms had to be
―substantially the same in all respects‖ to trigger the tariff’s
requirements.128 The court reasoned, first, that FERC’s interpretation was
nonsensical and in conflict with other terms in the tariff because the
interpretation would preclude new customers from making better offers.129
Additionally, the interpretation conflicted with Order 888, among others,
where the sales are subject to FERC regulation.‖); City of Kaukauna v. FERC, 214 F.3d 888,
894–95 (7th Cir. 2000); Wash. Urban League v. FERC, 886 F.2d 1381, 1386 (3d Cir. 1989)
(―We generally defer to an agency’s interpretation of agreements within the scope of the
agency’s expertise, and the case for deference is particularly strong when the agency has
interpreted regulatory terms regarding which it must often apply its expertise.‖ (citation
omitted)). The Fifth Circuit also reviews agencies’ contract interpretations de novo, though
it does not appear to have considered directly whether Chevron counsels a different
approach. See Davidson v. Glickman, 169 F.3d 996, 1000 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying de novo
standard to review of agency’s interpretation of crop insurance contract); see also Burgin v.
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 120 F.3d 494, 497–98 (4th Cir. 1997) (similar). But see Campbell v.
U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 384 F. Supp. 2d 951, 955 (W.D. Va. 2004) (distinguishing
Burgin and citing Chevron, reasoning that a full understanding of contract terms depended
on agency’s expertise). For more on whether courts should grant deference to agencies’
common law interpretations, see Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in
Review of Agency Decisions, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 799 (2010). See also Cuomo v. Clearing
House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519 (2009) (all members of the Court deemed Chevron applicable,
but the Justices disagreed how it should apply).
123. See Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply v. FERC, 811 F.2d 1563, 1571 (D.C. Cir. 1987); cf.
Williams Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 3 F.3d 1544, 1550–51 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (declining to
adopt vacillation rationale and applying Chevron where agency had adopted different
interpretation on rehearing). There is of course some tension between an agency developing
consistent national policy yet changing its position over time. Cf. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms.
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005) (holding that only a prior
judicial determination of a statute’s unambiguous meaning precludes an agency from later
changing its interpretation).
124. 312 F.3d 454 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
125. Id. at 462.
126. In Order No. 888, FERC required utilities to separate their transmission functions
from their wholesale merchant functions. See generally Promoting Wholesale Competition
Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities;
Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg.
21,540 (Apr. 24, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 385) [hereinafter Order No. 888].
127. Idaho Power, 312 F.3d at 457.
128. Id. at 462.
129. Id.
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and was a departure from FERC’s longstanding interpretation of the same
term in other pro forma tariffs.130
One final example of a second-order Chevron case is Arkansas v.
Oklahoma,131 which involved a federal agency’s interpretation of state
law.132 There, EPA had issued a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit to a discharger in Arkansas, upstream of
Oklahoma.133 The operative provisions of the Clean Water Act134 require
that any permit be consistent with both states’ water quality criteria.135
Oklahoma challenged the permit, arguing that its waters would be degraded
by the discharge and thus, that the permit should not have been granted.136
Interpreting that state’s standards, EPA determined that the permit could be
issued provided that there was no detectable violation of Oklahoma’s water
quality standards.137 Finding no violation, the agency issued the permit.138
The Tenth Circuit, however, held that even an undetectable contribution to
the degradation of Oklahoma’s waters was impermissible.139
The Supreme Court reversed. With respect to the degradation issue, it
cited Chevron and held that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to give
deference to EPA’s interpretation of the Oklahoma standard.140 This
conclusion was based on several considerations. First, the state water
quality standards (which were established by the state with guidance from
EPA and approved by EPA) took on the character of federal law by virtue
of their incorporation into the federal NPDES permitting scheme.141
Second, intrastate water pollution is a matter of federal law.142 And third,
―treating state standards in interstate controversies as federal law accords
with the Act’s purpose of authorizing the EPA to create and manage a
uniform system of interstate water pollution regulation.‖143 With the
Oklahoma standards having the character of federal law, the Court held that
―EPA’s reasonable, consistently held interpretation‖ was entitled to
deference.144
Admittedly, the Court did not go to great lengths to outline the
parameters of Chevron’s applicability. But its rationale is consistent with
that evidenced in the lower courts’ contract decisions: the authority being
interpreted had a federal character; the goal of developing uniform national
130. Id. at 464.
131. 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
132. Id. at 110.
133. Id. at 94.
134. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 33 U.S.C.).
135. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 110.
136. Id. at 95.
137. Id. at 97.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 98.
140. Id. at 110.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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policy over time mattered; and the agency’s consistency of interpretation
supported deference.145 Summed up, the second-order Chevron cases rely
most clearly on a series of general principles related to the following:
grants of authority (that is, delegation); expertise; uniformity; and
procedural detail.
C. Developing Generality Principles
Taken together, the three spectrum cases delineate the bounds within
which agencies may create their own legitimacy, while the second-order
decisions offer guidance on how to do that. American Trucking, UARG,
and Mead reveal much about Chevron’s role beyond the specific contexts in
which they arose.146 The doctrine sits at the confluence of separation of
powers concerns, the nondelegation doctrine, and the relationship between
procedural and substantive legitimacy.
By preserving the courts’
interpretive power for nondelegation concerns, American Trucking creates a
space outside of which agencies may not have a say in constructing their
own legitimacy.147 By reinforcing the precise language of a statute in the
face of lurking nondelegation concerns, UARG cautions that agencies may
be rigidly confined even under Chevron in the name of fidelity to statute.148
But by linking democratically legitimizing procedures to Chevron
eligibility, Mead recognizes that there is room for agencies to construct
their own legitimacy within the (vast) discretionary space that is left
over.149
The second-order decisions provide new examples of what agencies may
do in that space to enhance their legitimacy. 150 Provided they are operating
under a proper delegation of authority, they can choose procedures that
reinforce administrative law values and demonstrate that they have applied
their expertise.151 National uniformity and consistency over time matter as
well.152 But noting these generality principles’ existence is only the starting
point. If they are to be used for assessing intrinsic legitimacy, they must be
converted to metrics.
II. DERIVING METRICS FOR AGENCY BEHAVIOR
An enduring challenge for administrative law is finding ways to
legitimize agency behavior that is either unreviewable or rarely reviewed.
As described in the Introduction, judicial review is the prevailing answer to
145. The context raises important questions about the authority of both federal agencies
and federal courts. Suppose the Court and EPA had agreed that the Oklahoma statute
unambiguously permitted the discharge. In the usual Brand X situation, that holding would
have preclusive effect. But what about the Erie doctrine? Surely neither Oklahoma courts
nor agencies would be bound to that interpretation.
146. See generally supra Part I.A.
147. See generally supra Part I.A.1.
148. See generally supra Part I.A.2.
149. See generally supra Part I.A.3.
150. See generally supra Part I.B.
151. See supra notes 78–88, 118–21 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 123–45 and accompanying text.
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issues of legitimacy because it acts both as an ex ante and ex post check on
agency behavior.153 At the same time, Mead instructs that at least
sometimes, agencies can construct their own legitimacy.154 And the
second-order Chevron cases underscore the importance of Chevron’s
generality principles in achieving that result.155
Others have offered explorations of Chevron’s foundational principles;
Professor Seidenfeld’s collection of these, and elaboration of his own
Article III foundation, provides an excellent example.156 In some ways, my
analysis here overlaps with these other works. But my aim is different;
rather than articulating a justification for Chevron, I accept its existence and
consider what it tells us more broadly about how to assess agency actions.
Along the way, my analysis provides possible insights into some of
Chevron’s puzzles. But the more modest focus is to move forward the
conversation about deriving metrics for agency behavior.
In this vein, it is notable that many of the second-order cases rely on
Skidmore-like factors in deciding whether Chevron deference is
appropriate.157 Perhaps this sheds light on the Scalia/Breyer debate about
Chevron’s bright-line versus case-by-case applicability.158 My conclusion
that Chevron provides generality principles is consistent with Justice
Scalia’s preference of giving Chevron deference to any authoritative agency
position.159 But my argument that metrics themselves must consider a
variety of factors and be tailored to the specific agency action is better
aligned with Justice Breyer’s approach. The key difference is that for both
Justices, the debate concerns the appropriate judicial role. My focus on
actions that are insulated from review removes much of the force of Justice
Scalia’s approach. This should not be surprising. What is potentially
helpful is that removing the emphasis on judicial review can help pinpoint
just what it is courts provide when they undertake review. When such
review is lacking, we seek other ways to ensure that agencies maintain their
legitimacy.
A. The Scope of Agency Authority
All of the second-order Chevron cases rely to some extent on
congressional authorization for the relevant federal agency to make the
interpretations necessary to fulfill its statutory mandate. Indeed, Professors
Merrill and Hickman explain the tariff and settlement cases as examples of
Congress delegating authority to FERC to issue binding orders interpreting
such contracts.160
This straightforward approach helps distinguish
153. See supra notes 5–10 and accompanying text.
154. See generally supra Part I.A.3.
155. See generally supra Part I.B.
156. See Seidenfeld, supra note 25.
157. See supra note 122 (providing background).
158. See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 198–206 (framing the debate).
159. See generally Scalia, supra note 15.
160. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 897
(2001). Congress has expressly authorized FERC to adjudicate disputes involving filed
rates. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (2012).
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examples like Litton Financial Printing Division v. NLRB,161 where the
Supreme Court held that the NLRB’s interpretations of collective
bargaining agreements are not reviewable under Chevron because the
applicable statute delegates enforcement of those agreements to the courts
rather than the agency.162
Notice that these examples raise no American Trucking problems. In
fact, in the examples provided the agencies are not even making
interpretations bearing on the scope of their jurisdiction because they are
not interpreting their statutory mandates. This context obviates a puzzle
created by City of Arlington v. FCC.163 There, the Court held that Chevron
applies regardless of whether the agency interpretation can be said to
impact the scope of its jurisdiction.164 But the interplay of that holding with
American Trucking is perplexing. How can an agency receive Chevron
deference when it interprets the scope of its jurisdiction yet receive no
opportunity at all to save an impermissible delegation with a limiting
construction?
One answer is that the two issues are simply different: one involves the
scope of congressional authority; the other is directed at the scope of agency
authority. But consider Professor Pierce’s view that Chevron helps enforce
the nondelegation doctrine because it changes the incentives for
Congress.165
Coupled with UARG’s outcome, we can reach the
straightforward result that express terms of statutory mandates must always
prevail.
While the second-order Chevron cases did not present nondelegation or
jurisdictional issues, they might have: a party to an adjudication might have
challenged an agency’s statutory mandate or an interpretation of the
agency’s jurisdiction had it been raised in the case. The main point remains
the importance of fidelity to statute for agency legitimacy. Indeed, agency
actions that are rarely or never reviewable must still draw legitimacy from
fidelity to statute. Metrics assessing such fidelity are difficult to define in
the absence of precise instructions from Congress.166 But if such agency
actions are coupled with procedural protections—like reasoned decision
making and transparency—they signal to stakeholders and Congress the
potential need for more precise instructions. In this way, Congress is again
incentivized to avoid nondelegation problems with precise mandates, which
promotes clearer metrics to judge agencies’ fidelity to statute.
B. Agency Expertise, Uniformity, and Procedural Detail
Expertise is frequently cited as a justification for deference to
agencies,167 but it remains under-theorized from the standpoint of
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

501 U.S. 190 (1991).
Id. at 201–03; Merrill & Hickman, supra note 160, at 898–99.
133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
Id. at 1870–71.
Pierce, supra note 47, at 2230–32.
See Hammond & Markell, supra note 5, at 362–63.
See Hammond, supra note 8.
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determining exactly what it is and when an agency has applied it. The
second-order Chevron cases seem either to take its presence for granted, or
to make only a very rudimentary distinction between agencies applying
common law principles like interpretive canons for contracts (which do not
relate to expertise), and agencies interpreting terms of art like ―just and
reasonable,‖ which require agencies to apply their specialized knowledge
and experience. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that agencies are generally
the superior institutions to make the scientific and technical judgments
necessary to inform policymaking.168
When courts review agency expertise, their own opinions provide
translations that enable oversight and promote court-agency dialogue.169
But what about unreviewable agency actions? ―Expertise‖ is hardly a
metric. The second-order decisions (and Chevron itself) make mention of
expertise, but they often simply presume its existence rather than
independently analyze it.170 A few courts taking the functional approach
have determined that agencies do not apply expertise when they engage in
common law contract interpretation,171 but that approach likewise begs the
question: How do we know an agency has applied its expertise? The
answer seems to be that at this point, we don’t. The matter is undertheorized in the legal scholarship, though progress is underway.172 For
now, there seems to be an intuitive consensus that expertise provides some
legitimacy. How to develop and operationalize this factor is an area ripe for
further research.
Numerous scholars also have noted Chevron’s ability to promote
uniformity.173 Uniformity can have two meanings. It could reflect
nationally consistent policy, such as that FERC would develop in deciding
whether a contract includes just and reasonable rates. Or it might reflect
consistency over time, such as was lacking in FERC’s interpretation of its
OATT provisions. For agency actions that are not reviewable, uniformity
ought to be easier to test than expertise because it is capable of objective
proof.
Finally, procedural detail is the recurring theme for agency legitimacy. It
is in choice of procedures that Mead grounds agencies’ abilities to construct
their legitimacy. Further, scholars have demonstrated how procedures are
tied to legitimacy, both in furthering administrative law values and in
168. See generally id.
169. See id. See generally Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in
Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722 (2011).
170. E.g., Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply v. Texas, 811 F.2d 1563, 1570 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(presuming expertise without analyzing it).
171. E.g., Nw. Pipeline Corp. v. FERC, 61 F.3d 1479, 1486–87 (10th Cir. 1995)
(applying National Fuel Gas Supply rationale to FERC’s interpretation of natural gas
pipeline tariff).
172. Importantly, in relying on expertise, it is crucial not to incentivize agencies to ―pile
on‖ the science, cloaking policy decisions in impenetrable scientific and technical records.
Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613
(1995).
173. See Strauss, supra note 11, at 1118–29; see also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 160,
at 861–62.
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promoting procedural justice.174 Like uniformity, procedural detail is not
particularly difficult to operationalize as a metric because it can be
objectively observed. That is (provided the agency is transparent),
stakeholders can determine without too much difficulty whether an agency
provided notice of its activities, invited participation, and responded to
input, and the like.
C. Possible Objections
Many Chevron aficionados may well wonder about the place for political
accountability in this framework. After all, Chevron itself is grounded in
presidential accountability.175 By omitting this theory as a factor for
measuring legitimacy, I do not mean to suggest that it does not matter. But
it is interesting that the factor plays little to no role in the second-order
Chevron decisions. As a descriptive matter,176 this omission invites
rethinking about the place of presidential control in administrative law
doctrine. On the other hand, the example in the Introduction involving EPA
and electricity reliability shows that the President may be directly involved
in formulating agency policies that are nevertheless unreviewable. Perhaps
it may be said that the metrics I suggest here are best used for situations in
which neither the executive nor the courts are involved in reviewing agency
behavior. These agency actions are all the more insulated from scrutiny,
and all the more in need of indicia of legitimacy.
Another concern relates to operationalizing these metrics: all rely on
agency transparency. One cannot assess any of them without some sort of
reviewable record. On the other hand, agencies need to get their work done
without creating massive records like they would if they were expecting
judicial review. In other words, ossification might be a concern. My own
experience with a first attempt at assessing agency behavior in the absence
of judicial review provides at least anecdotal evidence that transparency
does not lead inexorably to ossification.177 Agencies’ letters, emails, and
other informal memoranda are often available under the Freedom of
Information Act178 (FOIA).179 That said, relying on FOIA is unsatisfactory
because it is time-consuming, and for some requesters, expensive. Most
problematic, it is likely to produce records after the fact, when decisions
have already been made and it is too late for meaningful participation.
Publishing more information online and in the Federal Register would

174. See Hammond & Markell, supra note 5, at 320–30 (making this demonstration and
collecting other sources).
175. See Bressman, supra note 7, at 1763–65.
176. Indeed, in his contribution to the symposium, Peter Shane makes the rule of law and
legitimacy argument that congressional delegation—not political accountability—should be
the primary theoretical underpinning for Chevron, such that courts should respect
congressional decisions to delegate decision-making authority in agency officials other than
the President. See Shane, supra note 4, at 680, 685.
177. See Hammond & Markell, supra note 5, at 333–34 (describing study design).
178. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
179. See Hammond & Markell, supra note 5, at 333–34.
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create transparency in many cases, and it would promote the ability to
assess agency behavior.
CONCLUSION
Thirty years later, Chevron might be understood as providing a set of
generality principles. It represents an intuitive approach to administrative
law that derives agency legitimacy not from any single source, but from a
set of principles. The courts’ use of these principles in second-order
decisions—those in which agencies have not interpreted their statutory
mandates—helps justify applying the principles more generally. The
possibility of transforming those principles into metrics for assessing
unreviewable agency behavior is enticing.
This Essay identifies those principles—fidelity to statute, expertise,
uniformity, and procedural detail—and suggests a few considerations for
operationalizing them as metrics. Although the real work of actual
operationalization still needs to be done, I hope that this Essay is useful for
highlighting both the need for further work and the enduring generality of
Chevron.

